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age and a high share of short-term debt, reduced the cumulative total return of US
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1 Introduction
REIT managers are able to mitigate capital structure risk in two fundamental ways:
They can always be conservative, or they can dynamically adjust capital structure in
anticipation of future market conditions. Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) find that
firms with a conservative capital structure at the start of the 2007-2009 financial
crisis performed better during the financial crisis. On the other hand, their findings
suggest that risky capital structure characteristics, such as high leverage and a high
share of short-term debt, significantly reduced the cumulative total return of US
REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis period.
We extend this study by documenting that REITs that dynamically adjusted their
capital structure prior to the financial crisis performed better during the financial
crisis, after controlling for their capital structure characteristics at the start of 2007.
Our finding thus suggests that shareholders rewarded REIT managers who correctly
identified the risk of a financial crisis and took actions to prepare for it by mitigating
capital structure risks. Our result implies that, in addition to selecting profitable
investments and managing them effectively, REIT managers are able to improve firm
value through dynamic financing choices in anticipation of future risks. In economic
terms, our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation reduction in leverage
before the financial crisis generated a 5% higher cumulative return 2007-2009.
In order to distinguish between deliberate and lucky changes in capital structure, we
further identify two systematic cross-sectional differences among those REITs that
made adjustments to their capital structure ahead of the financial crisis and those
that did not. We find that US REITs with higher capital structure risks, that is, high
leverage and short debt maturity, were significantly more likely to reduce leverage
and extend debt maturity, as were those REITs with stronger corporate governance.
On balance, our evidence is therefore consistent with the interpretation of risk-
reducing changes in capital structure ahead of the financial crisis as a component of
managerial skill and discipline rather than luck.
As a falsification test, we investigate whether any of these results hold in a sample of
European REITs. Since excessive real estate lending prior to 2007 was arguably pre-
dominantly a US phenomenon, shareholders of European REITs should not reward
risk reductions in capital structure in the same way as in the US. As expected, we
find that none of our results hold in the European sample. In other words, our find-
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ings suggest that European REITs that reduced leverage or extended debt maturity
before the financial crisis received no benefit during the financial crisis.
Overall, our findings suggest that US REIT managers were able to observe warn-
ing signals of an impending crisis prior to 2007, generating an opportunity to reduce
capital structure risks. Our findings further suggest that such adjustments to capital
structure were perceived as a positive signal by shareholders. On the other hand, we
find that adjusting risky capital structure in Europe was not rewarded by sharehold-
ers in the same way it was in the US. This finding seems intuitive as the European
REIT market was not subject to the same levels of real estate lending as the US
markets prior to the financial crisis in 2007-2009. However, we note that the sample
size for the European REITs is smaller than for the US REITs, and interpret the
corresponding results with caution.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 develops our
testable hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the role of corporate governance in the con-
text of our study. Section 5 describes data and empirical method. Section 6 discusses
our empirical results. Section 7 presents robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical links between capital structure and firm performance
Traditional theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and equity risk,
raising the required return on equity (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Empirical re-
search broadly agrees on the significance of leverage for equity returns (Choi, 2013;
Garcia-Feijo´o and Jorgensen, 2010; Garlappi and Yan, 2011; Gomes and Schmid,
2010; Obreja, 2013), but the direction of its effect is unresolved. Bhandari (1988)
and Fama and French (1992) find the expected positive relationship between leverage
and returns. More recent research however finds an inverse relationship (Dimitrov
and Jain, 2008; George and Hwang, 2010; Penman, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007). 1
Similarly, little definitive evidence is available on the relationship between leverage
and returns in real estate firms. Again, some find an inverse relationship (Cheng and
Roulac, 2007; Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo, 2015b; Ling and Naranjo, 2015; Sun,
Titman, and Twite, 2015), while others find a positive relationship (Giacomini, Ling,
and Naranjo, 2015a), and others yet find no evidence for a significant relationship
(Pavlov, Steiner, and Wachter, 2015).
1 Others find that the relationship is non-linear (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan, 2008; Korteweg, 2010), or condi-
tional on the firm’s distance from optimal target leverage (Hull, 1999; Steri, Ippolito, and Tebaldi, 2012).
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Furthermore, some authors have explored the link between leverage and risk directly.
In relation to systematic risk, Allen, Madura, and Springer (2000) argue that finan-
cial leverage magnifies the firm’s equity returns when the return on the market is
positive. Conversely, their argument continues that leverage also magnifies negative
returns, creating more pronounced losses. This line of reasoning is consistent with
the argument in Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007) that leverage in-
creases the firm’s exposure to variation in the return on the market. Empirically,
Sun and Yung (2009) find mixed evidence on the relation between leverage and
REIT total volatility. Chaudhry, Maheshwari, and Webb (2004) find that leverage
drives REIT idiosyncratic risk but the direction of the effect is sensitive to model
specification.
In this study, we extend the evidence for the relationship between and REIT per-
formance in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 that is presented in Sun, Titman, and
Twite (2015). The effect of leverage during a crisis is particularly relevant in light
of the financial accelerator, which exacerbates the implications of a market decline
through the tightening of credit conditions (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1996; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Perez-Quiros and Timmer-
mann, 2000). Tighter credit conditions disproportionately affect firms with higher
leverage. REITs as an industry tend to be consistently more highly levered than
standard industrial firms (Barclay, Heitzman, and Smith, 2013; Harrison, Panasian,
and Seiler, 2011). In addition, the REIT payout requirement means that REITs are
unable to rely on internal cash reserves to absorb liquidity shocks (Ott, Riddiough,
and Yi, 2005), increasing the need for proactive leverage choices to maintain financial
flexibility. 2 Therefore, exploring the ways in which managers may adjust their lever-
age position to improve the resilience of their firms in periods of financial turmoil is
particularly important in light of these characteristics of the REIT industry.
3 Hypothesis development
One of the most widely accepted predictions of traditional capital structure the-
ory is that firms with higher volatility face a higher probability of bankruptcy. 3
Therefore, firms facing higher volatility should carry lower leverage. While the tra-
2 This link is highlighted, for instance, in Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2011); DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(2007); DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011); Denis and McKeon (2012); and Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(2011). A review of this literature is provided in Denis (2011).
3 Early studies generating this conclusion include Modigliani and Miller (1958), Scott (1976), Brennan and
Schwartz (1984) and Leland (1994), among others.
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ditional literature only considers constant volatility, Chen, Wang, and Zhou (2014),
among others, interpret this to mean that “firms will adjust their leverage downward
(upward) when they expect that volatility has risen (fallen)” (p. 4).
More recent studies that focus on stochastic volatility or regime switching of the
volatility in firm cash flows or asset values, such as Chen and Kou (2009) and El-
liott and Shen (2015), confirm that firms reduce leverage when the expected future
volatility of cash flows or underlying assets increases. While this result seems in-
tuitive, capturing signals of changes in the future volatility of asset values or cash
flows is not trivial. Consider a manager who receives a noisy signal of the change in
future volatility, ∆σˆi,t:
∆σˆi,t = σi,t+1 + ˜i,t+1 (1)
where i denotes a particular manager, t denotes the current time period and ∆σi,t =
σi,t+1−σi,t measures the true unobservable change in volatility going forward. Man-
agers differ in the precision with which they perceive signals of changes in future
volatility, that is in the variance of the noise component, v2i = var(˜i,t+1), which is
not observable by shareholders. Each period managers receive a noisy signal about
future volatility and adjust their capital structure according to this signal. This
adjustment is attenuated relative to the outcome of the structural models in the lit-
erature because managers recognise that their future volatility estimate is noisy. Let
g(∆σˆi,t, v
2
i ) denote the function managers use to decide on the amount and direction
of change in leverage in view of the signal about the future change in volatility. This
function depends on the variance of the noise. Managers who receive noisy signals
adjust their capital structure very little even if their signal indicates a substantial
change in the future, so that
∂2g(∆σˆi,t, v
2
i )
∂∆σˆi,t∂v2i
< 0 (2)
In other words, the change in leverage in response to a signal is a decreasing function
of noise variance. This in theory leads to the following hypothesis: Managers who
adjust their capital structure more in response to a signal about a change in future
volatility have more precise signals. However, this hypothesis is not testable because
shareholders do not observe the signal each manager receives.
Instead, shareholders need to rely on the actual change in volatility, once it is ob-
served. This leads to the following hypothesis: Managers who adjust their capital
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structure more in response to the actual change in volatility have more precise sig-
nals. Since the actual change in volatility is only observable after the change has
occurred, the second hypothesis is only testable ex-post.
Even with this, testing the latter hypothesis presents two difficulties. First, it is
testable only if the change in volatility is large relative to the variance of the noise.
For instance, it may be tested during a crisis, but not during normal economic con-
ditions. Second, empiricists do not observe the precision of the signals that managers
receive. One way to estimate the precision of the signals the managers receive, which
reflects an important managerial skill, is to use the stock performance when manage-
rial actions and the size of the actual change in volatility are revealed. If managerial
actions were consistent with the change in volatility, then the precision of the signal
for that manager is revealed and its value is incorporated into the stock price. This
discussion leads to the following empirically testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Firms whose managers adjust capital structure more in response to
large changes in future volatility have higher stock returns when the consequences of
their actions and the actual change in volatility are revealed.
Inevitably, some managers with typically precise signals may receive an imprecise
signal purely by chance. Similarly, some managers with typically imprecise signals
may receive a strong signal and as a consequence react appropriately. In other words,
some managers may be particularly lucky or unlucky in adjusting their capital struc-
ture at the right time. In conclusion, we expect that on average, REITs whose man-
agers adjusted the firm’s capital structure more experience higher stock returns in
the period when the consequences of their actions are revealed.
While we are unlikely to be able to fully distinguish between managerial skill and
luck in adjusting capital structure in response to a signal of a change in future
volatility, we nevertheless explore the evidence for two related hypotheses. We will
argue that empirical support for these hypotheses is on balance more consistent with
managerial skill rather than luck as the dominating driver behind capital structure
adjustments prior to a change in volatility.
First, if a signal about an increase in future volatility is correct and precedes and ac-
tual increase, then firms with higher leverage and more refinancing risk (shorter debt
maturity) will be affected disproportionately by the eventual volatility shock, as a re-
sult of the financial accelerator effect. Therefore, if there is managerial skill involved
6
in driving adjustments to capital structure choices prior to an expected increase in
volatility, then it seems plausible that this skill also extends to the recognition of the
firm’s financial risk. As a result, we expect capital structure adjustments in response
to a signal about an increase in future volatility to be larger for firms that currently
face higher capital structure risks, i.e. those firms with higher leverage and shorter
debt maturity. This discussion leads to the the second testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2(a): Firms with higher capital structure-related risks, i.e. firms with
higher leverage and shorter debt maturity, are more likely to adjust their capital
structure when expecting large changes in future volatility.
Second, another component that distinguishes lucky adjustments in capital structure
prior to a change in asset value or cash flow volatility from systematic adjustments
that relate to management quality is corporate governance. If corporate governance
is strong, then we argue that, consequently, managers are well incentivised to observe
signals about changes in future volatility carefully in order to adjust the financial
position of their firm in a way that enables the firm to be resilient to any future
financial shocks. Therefore, we expect capital structure adjustments in response to
a signal about an increase in future volatility to be larger for firms that have strong
corporate governance. We further elaborate on the role of corporate governance in
capital structure choices in the next section. This discussion leads to the final testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2(b): Firms with strong corporate governance are more likely to adjust
their capital structure when expecting large changes in future volatility.
As noted, outsiders are unable to observe any signals that managers may perceive
about changes in future volatility. As a result, empiricists need to rely on actual
changes in volatility. These actual changes in volatility also need to be large to be
empirically observable to a noticeable degree of significance. Therefore, we use the
period around the 2007/2008 financial crisis to test our hypotheses. Specifically, we
use the change in leverage in the pre-crisis period (over the year of 2006) and the
stock return over the subsequent period during which the managerial actions and
the size of the volatility increase were revealed (2007-2009). 4
4 There are other historical temporal events, both in the US and abroad, that we would like to consider as
additional robustness checks, especially given the relatively smaller small sample size in some of our tests.
We acknowledge that evidence from these previous periods of high real estate market volatility would be
useful to illustrate how shareholders benefitted from observing capital structure decisions made ahead of
those periods, e.g. in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, our data provider, SNL Financial, does
not cover this period for international REITs, or indeed a large and comprehensive sample of US REITs.
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This discussion is phrased in terms of changes in leverage. However, there are other
capital structure adjustments that may serve the same purpose. Consistent with
Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015), we focus on the role of debt maturity alongside
that of leverage. Managers who receive more precise signals about future volatility
may reduce refinancing risk by extending debt maturity. As a result, we expand
hypotheses (1) and 2(a) to 2(b) to the amount and direction of changes in debt
maturity, measured as the share of debt due in 2-3 years.
4 The role of corporate governance
In our empirical analysis, we analyse the cross-section of financing choices prior to the
financial crisis of 2007-2009 as a function of corporate governance. We examine this
relationship for the following reasons. Grossman and Hart (1983) develop a model for
the firm’s financing choice in the presence of agency conflicts between shareholders
and managers. More recently, Novaes and Zingales (1995) show that the optimal
choice of debt from the viewpoint of shareholders differs from the optimal choice
of debt from the viewpoint of managers. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) summarise the
reasons for this difference: (i) shareholders are more diversified than managers whose
human capital is tied to the firm (Fama, 1980); (ii) debt is a disciplining divide for
managers (Jensen, 1986); and (iii) Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) argue
that managers increase leverage to increase their voting power and reduce takeover
risk. 5 As a result, we expect that corporate governance has an influence on the way
in which managers make financing choices. 6
The next set of questions relates to the measurement of corporate governance, that
is, (i) the number of provisions to be included, (ii) the most appropriate data source,
and (iii) the most appropriate timing of the observations on those provisions. Gom-
pers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) are the first to document a systematic relationship
between a comprehensive measure of corporate governance, labelled the G-index, and
firm performance. They develop their governance measure as an equally-weighted
index of 24 provisions that restrict shareholder rights. Cremers and Nair (2005) use
There are other periods of real estate market declines across the world, for instance the 1997 Asian financial
crisis. However, we found it difficult to obtain international data for those periods that reliably capture the
required variables in the relevant countries.
5 In addition to this literature on capital structure and managerial entrenchment, a different body of
research examines the relation between capital structure and ownership structure as well, e.g. Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
6 It may be argued that corporate governance provisions are less significant in REITs because of their
strict regulatory environment. However, Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2010), Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu
(2008) Hartzell, Sun, and Titman (2006) confirm that firm-level corporate governance still has a significant
impact on REIT corporate financial decisions, stock valiant and performance outcomes.
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similar data to compile a governance measure that distinguishes between internal
and external governance. However, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) argue that
some of these provisions may be correlated. Therefore, they focus on a subset of the
6 provisions to develop an entrenchment index, labelled E-index, based on informa-
tion about staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements. They find that these are the
most significant provisions in the determination of firm value. This finding suggests
that a small number of governance provisions is able to capture the majority of the
impact of governance on corporate financial outcomes.
The data used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell
(2009) and Cremers and Nair (2005) is compiled by the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC). Brown and Caylor (2006) develop a governance index
using data from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). This index is comprised
of 52 corporate governance provisions. The results are qualitatively similar across
those studies, suggesting that governance provisions are easily observed and the
exact source of the data is of little concern to the accuracy of the measurements.
Lastly, the G-index based on the IRRC data used by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) has been discontinued in 2007 after the acquisition of IRRC by ISS Risk
Metrics. More recent studies, such as Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) assign
the most recent value available from IRRC to their sample firms from 2007 onwards.
This approach of focusing on recent cross-sectional variation in governance provisions
is further supported by the observation that most time series variation in corporate
governance occurred in the 1980s (Cremers and Ferrell, 2014).
As a result of this discussion, we obtain information on the firm’s corporate gover-
nance provisions as follows. First, we use data from SNL. The former IRRC, now
ISS Risk Metrics data covers the 1,500 largest US corporations. As a result, the
coverage for REITs is not comprehensive, because typical REIT firm size is smaller.
The SNL data allows us to obtain governance data on more REITs. The provisions
covered by SNL are consistent with those covered in data bases such as IRRC (until
2007) or ISS. They include a sub-set of the 24 provisions in the original G-index,
and also fewer than in the E-index, but they are current observations. The included
provisions are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajority requirements. Over-
all, we believe that the benefit of the availability of current observations on these
important provisions for a broader set of firms outweighs that of having a larger
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number of provisions available but for a smaller set of firms, which may also be
stale, as in the case of the IRRC legacy data.
The presence of these three provisions, staggered board, poison pill, and superma-
jority requirements, restricts shareholder rights. Following the methodology in Gom-
pers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we calculate a governance score by starting from zero
and adding a point for the presence of each provision. A higher governance score
thus indicates a more dictatorial firm with weaker shareholder rights. This variable
allows us to assess the impact of corporate governance on capital structure choices
in the run-up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
We calculate the SNL good governance indicator on the basis of the SNL governance
score by splitting its distribution in 2006 along the median. Firms in the lower part
of the distribution have fewer provisions that restrict shareholder rights. We assign
those firms an SNL good governance indicator value of 1, and zero otherwise. In
order to support the suitability of our measure of corporate governance empirically,
we construct a scatter plot of the REIT discount/premium to NAV as a function
of the SNL good governance indicator. Figure 1 shows a slightly upwards sloping
relationship between the SNL governance indicator and the price/NAV ratio, sug-
gesting that firms with a more shareholder-friendly governance structure are valued
more highly relative to the value of their underlying assets.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
5 Data and method
5.1 Data set and descriptive statistics
We study all listed US and European equity REITs on SNL Financial as of the end
of 2005. We analyse capital structure choices in the year leading up to the financial
crisis in 2007, i.e. capital structure choices over the year 2006. Individual firm data
is obtained from SNL Financial.
We measure the variables in our analysis following Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015).
Performance during the financial crisis is measured as the cumulative monthly rates
of total return for the time period January 2007 to February 2009, winsorised at
the 2nd and 98th percentiles to mitigate any undue influence of outliers. We focus
on leverage and debt maturity because the evidence for the impact of variable-rate
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debt in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) is mixed. We measure the change in leverage
over the year 2006 as the first difference of market leverage. 7 Market leverage is the
ratio of total debt (book value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt)
to market value of invested capital. Market value of invested capital is the sum of
total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation (number of shares outstanding
multiplied by the end-of-period share price). For US REITs, we measure the change
in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For Eu-
ropean REITs, we use the change in the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as European
REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule.
As control variables, we include: the level of leverage and the share of debt due in
2-3 years, firm size (log of market capitalisation), Tobin’s q (ratio of firm market
value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less book value of equity, to total
assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets).
Table 1 presents summary statistics as of the end of 2006. 8 On average, the US
sample firms reduced leverage and debt (due in 2-3 years) over the year 2006. How-
ever, variation around the means is significant, with a standard deviation of 0.07
for leverage and 0.24 for debt maturity, suggesting that capital structure choices
during 2006 varied substantially across firms. The European firms in our sample on
average reduced leverage over the year 2006 by the same amount as US firms, with
the same standard deviation. It appears that the European firms have increased the
share of debt due in 1-5 years. However, this measure is a noisy indicator of debt
due during the financial crisis, as reporting rules only require European firms to
disclose the amount of debt due in 1-5 years, rather than on an annual basis. The
levels of leverage are similar across the US and European firms (0.39 versus 0.35),
but the debt maturity measures are not comparable, due to reporting differences.
The mean of the SNL governance score is lower in the US than in Europe (0.34
versus 0.59), suggesting strong shareholder rights in the US. European REITs are
on average smaller than in the US (log of firm size of 13.98 to 14.20), have a lower
Tobin’s q (1.15 versus 1.55), hold similar levels of cash-to-assets (0.03) and have
experienced a similar cumulative total return over the period of the financial crisis
2007-2009 (-0.56 and -0.59).
7 Leverage ratios may be driven by denominator effects through the market cycle. However, we assume
that REIT managers are aware of this effect and factor it into their capital structure choices through time.
8 The firms in our sample cover the sectors Diversified, Health Care, Hotel, Office, Residential, Retail and
Specialty. Descriptive statistics by property sector are provided in the Appendix, see Tables A.1 and A.2 for
the US firms, and Tables B.1 and B.2 for the European firms, respectively.
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[Insert Table 1 here.]
Table 2 presents pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables in our study.
We find significant inverse correlations between the cumulative total return and a
number of firm characteristics in the US, especially leverage and debt maturity,
consistent with the observations in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015). In addition,
we find inverse relationships between a reduction in leverage and a reduction in
debt maturing in the 2007-2009 period, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis.
Furthermore, larger firms seem to have experienced a lower cumulative total return
over the period in question. However, pairwise correlation does not measure the
marginal impact of reducing leverage or adjusting the debt maturity profile of the
firm.
In the European sample, the only significant pairwise correlation is a positive rela-
tionship between corporate governance and the cumulative total return, but again,
we explore marginal effects in the conditional analysis. Furthermore, Table 2 shows
levels of correlation below 0.8 among the main predictors of interest, alleviating
concerns about multicollinearity.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
5.2 Empirical method
Capital structure choices in 2006 and performance during the financial crisis
In order to test hypothesis 1, we examine the extent to which the capital structure
adjustments that REIT managers made during 2006 are related to REIT perfor-
mance in terms of the cumulative total return during the subsequent crisis period
2007-2009. In order to explore the effect of leverage choices, we estimate the following
cross-sectional regression for the US REITs in our sample using OLS:
CTRi = β0 + β1D.MLevi + β2MLevi + β3LNSizei + β4Qi + β5Cashi + ui (3)
where β0 is a constant, βj is the regression coefficient corresponding to the ex-
planatory variable j and u is the residual. Subscript i refers to firm i. CTR is the
cumulative total return 2007-2009. D.MLev is the change in market leverage during
2006. MLev is the level of market leverage at the end of 2006, capturing the effect
documented in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015). LNSize is the log of firm size, Q is
Tobin’s q, and Cash is the cash-to-assets ratio, all measured as of the end of 2006.
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We also include sector fixed-effects and report heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors.
We perform a falsification test using European REIT data over the same time period.
Recall from Table 1 that European REITs generally experienced smaller declines over
the 2007-2009 period than their US counterparts. Yet, the decline in the European
REIT market was still substantial and thus likely qualifies under the definition of
a significant change in volatility in hypothesis 1. However, European real estate
markets did not experience the same level of real estate lending prior to the financial
crisis. Therefore, a European REIT manager was less likely to observe a strong signal
about an increase in future volatility than a US manager. As a result, a pre-crisis
reduction in leverage does not contain the same information for a European REIT
as it does for a US REIT. In short, the relationship in hypothesis 1 should not hold
for European REITs.
We explore the effect of changes in debt maturity using regression (3) but we re-
place the change in leverage with the change in debt due in 2-3 years during 2006,
D.Mat23, as follows:
CTRi = β0 + β1D.Mat23i + β2LNSizei + β3Qi + β4Cashi + ui (4)
Further, in order to explore the relationships of interest in the European firms in
our sample, we run the regressions for these firms separately. In the debt maturity
equation, we replace the variable measuring the change in debt due in 2-3 years
during 2006 with the change in debt due in 1-5 years during 2006, D.Mat15. We
estimate the following model:
CTRi = β0 + β1D.Mat15i + β2LNSizei + β3Qi + β4Cashi + ui (5)
Cross-sectional analysis
In order to test hypothesis 2, and distinguish between managerial skill and luck
that may have determined the changes in capital structure in 2006, we examine the
question whether those firms that were more at risk were aware of their situation
and were more likely to adjust their capital structure to a more robust position in
the run-up to the financial crisis. We estimate the following logit model for the US
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REITs in our sample:
Redi = β0 + β1L.MLevi + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (6)
where β0 is a constant, βj is the coefficient of the explanatory variable j and u is
the residual. Red is the likelihood that a firm reduced leverage by 0.05 or more in
2006. While this cut-off level is arbitrary, it does capture the notion that the leverage
reduction needs to be substantial to be identified as a clear managerial choice. For
robustness, we employ a range of alternative cut-off levels, including including the
mean and median of leverage reductions. L.MLev is the lag of leverage, measured
at the end of 2005. LNSize is the lagged log of firm size, Q is lagged Tobin’s q, and
Cash is the lagged cash-to-assets ratio, all measured as of the end of 2005. If firms
with higher leverage were aware of their situation and took precautionary measures
to de-lever in the run-up to the financial crisis, then we expect β1 to be positive and
significant. We also include sector fixed-effects. As before, we run the regressions for
the US and European sample firms separately.
In order to explore the likelihood that firms extend short debt maturity, we run
regression (6) and replace the dependent variable with the likelihood that a firm
reduced the share of debt due in 2-3 years by 0.05 or more in 2006, D.Mat23.
Again, the choice of 5% is specific but the sign and significance of β1 are robust
to various cut-off values, including the mean and median of the variable. The main
variable of interest is the lagged share of debt due in 2-3 years, L.Mat23. If firms
with short debt maturity were aware of their refinancing risk and adjusted capital
structure accordingly, then we expect the coefficient on L.Mat23 to be positive
and significant. As before, we include sector fixed-effects. We estimate the following
model:
Ext23i = β0 + β1L.Mat23i + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (7)
Again, we examine the European sample firms separately. In the debt maturity
equation, we replace the Ext23 variable with the likelihood that a firm extended
debt maturity through reducing the share of debt due in 1-5 years by 0.05 or more
in 2006, Ext15. The main dependent variable of interest is the share of debt due
in 1-5 years in 2005, L.Mat15. If European REITs with short debt maturity were
aware of their refinancing risk and adjusted capital structure accordingly, then we
expect the coefficient on the variable L.Mat15 to be positive and significant. As
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before, we include sector fixed-effects to account for unobservables and estimate the
following model:
Ext15i = β0 + β1L.Mat15i + β2L.LNSizei + β3L.Qi + β4L.Cashi + ui (8)
Finally, we explore the role of corporate governance on the extent to which REITs
with risky capital structures took precautionary measures to create more robust
capital structures in the run-up to the financial crisis. In this analysis, we create
interaction terms with the capital structure variables that put firms at risk from a
financial shock as suggested in Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015). For the US part of
the sample, we create an indicator/interaction term for those firms that had above-
median leverage or above-median shares of debt due in 2-3 years at the end of 2005.
We estimate the following logit model for the sample of US REITs:
Redi = β0 + β1HighLevi ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.MLevi + β3L.SNLGovi (9)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
where L.SNLGov is the lag of the SNL governance score as of the end of 2005,
and the other coefficients and variables are defined as in (6). If stronger shareholder
rights help rein in excessive leverage, then we expect a positive and significant coef-
ficient on the interaction variable with an indicator based on below-average values
of L.SNLGov, where a higher governance score indicates weaker shareholder rights.
Similarly to (9), we estimate this model for the likelihood to extend debt maturity
for US sample REITs:
Ext23i = β0 + β1ShortMat23i ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.Mat23 + β3L.SNLGovi (10)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
where coefficients and variables are defined as in (9). As before, we include sector
fixed effects in all of these regressions. For the European sample firms, we estimate:
RedEuri = β0 + β1HighLevi ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.MLevi + β3L.SNLGovi (11)
+ β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
Ext15i = β0 + β1ShortMat15i ∗ StrongGovi + β2L.Mat15 (12)
+ β3L.SNLGovi + β4L.LNSizei + β5L.Qi + β6L.Cashi + ui
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6 Results
6.1 Unconditional analysis
We begin by exploring the relationships between REIT characteristics and leverage
choices using an unconditional, multivariate analysis. In Table 3 we sort observa-
tions into quintiles ranked by market leverage, with quintile 1 containing the lowest
leverage firms and quintile 5 containing the highest leverage firms. We tabulate the
corresponding mean firm characteristics in each quintile and then test the hypothesis
that these means differ significantly across the top and bottom quintiles.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
Table 3 shows that firms with high leverage tended to see their leverage increase
in 2006. Beyond that, the only firm characteristic that the sample firms with high
leverage have in common is a lower Tobin’s q ratio. If we interpret Tobin’s q as a
measure of growth opportunities, then our finding reflects that firms with higher
growth opportunities have lower levels of leverage in order to avoid agency costs
of underinvestment (Myers, 1977). There is no evidence of significant relationships
between leverage and firm characteristics in the European sample.
Next, we graphically explore the relationships between REIT capital structure choices
and the cumulative total return 2007-2009. Figure 2 (3) shows the results for the US
(Europe). Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2 show the downward sloping relationship
between the levels of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, respectively,
and the cumulative total return on US REITs during the period 2007-2009. This
downward sloping relationship is consistent with the findings presented in Sun, Tit-
man, and Twite (2015) and Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015a). However, Panels
(c) and (d) show of Figure 2 additionally show a downward sloping relationship be-
tween changes in leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, respectively, and
the cumulative total return 2007-2009. This finding is consistent with hypothesis
1, that precautionary adjustments to capital structure choices contributed to the
cumulative total return during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Figure 3 shows the corresponding relationships for the European REITs. Panel (a)
shows a downward sloping relationship between leverage and firm performance in
2007-2009. This observation extends the evidence presented in Sun, Titman, and
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Twite (2015) from the US to international REITs. However, Panel (b) shows a
flat relationship between European REIT performance and the share of short-term
debt due during the financial crisis, suggesting that the debt maturity policy of
European REITs was less correlated with firm performance during the financial
crisis. Panels (c) and (d) show the relationships between the changes in leverage and
the share of debt due during the financial crisis, respectively, and firm performance
2007-2009. These plots show slightly upward sloping relationships. The lack of a
negative relationship between changes in leverage and the cumulative total return
for the European REITs is consistent with expectations. However, we report this
result with caution, as it is based on a relatively smaller sample. Nevertheless, we
take comfort in the observation that the relationship between change in leverage
and return is actually positive and significant, rather than non-existent. Despite the
small sample, this makes it less likely that the true relationship is negative, as we
find for US REITs.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
In order to explore the relationships between REIT capital structure choices and the
cumulative total return 2007-2009 further, we sort observations into quintiles ranked
by the cumulative total return 2007-2009, with quintile 1 containing the firms with
the lowest return and quintile 5 containing the with the highest return. We tabulate
the corresponding capital structure choices, in levels and changes, in each quintile
and then test the hypothesis that the means differ significantly across the top and
bottom quintiles. Table 4 shows the results.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
This preliminary unconditional analysis suggests that firms with lower leverage and
a lower share of debt due during the financial crisis achieved a higher cumulative
total return during 2007-2009. This finding is consistent with Sun, Titman, and
Twite (2015) and Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015a). Additionally, firms that
reduced their leverage and the share of debt due during the financial crisis over the
course of 2006 also registered a numerically higher cumulative total return during
the financial crisis. The difference between the top and bottom quintiles does not
pass the threshold for statistical significance. However, this unconditional analysis
does not measure marginal effects and is thus unable to account for any correlation
between the levels of the capital structure variables of interest and changes in those
variables. In this unconditional analysis, we generally find no evidence of significant
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associations between the cumulative total return 2007-2009 and capital structure
choices in the European sample. With these preliminary results in mind, we now
turn to the conditional analysis. 9 , 10
6.2 Conditional analysis
Table 5 presents the main regression results. 11 The dependent variable is the cu-
mulative total return over the period 2007-2009. In Column 1, the main variable of
interest is the change in market leverage from the end of 2005 to the end of 2006.
We find that the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant at the 5%
level. This finding is robust to including the level of market leverage at the end of
2006 and the set of control variables. 12 The main finding of our analysis is there-
fore consistent with hypothesis 1: Reducing leverage before the financial crisis (over
the year 2006) was associated with a higher cumulative total return for US REITs
during the financial crisis (2007-2009).
[Insert Table 5 here.]
The impact of changes in leverage before the financial crisis on the cumulative total
return during the financial crisis is also economically significant. The estimated
coefficient of -0.783 implies that a one percentage point reduction in leverage before
the financial crisis was associated with a 78 basis points increase in cumulative total
return during the financial crisis. Reducing leverage by one standard deviation (seven
percentage points) was associated with an increase in the cumulative total return
during the financial crisis of 5.5%. Given the size of the REIT industry, this change
translates into a potential US$10 billion of additional market value at the end of the
financial crisis.
Column 2 of Table 5 suggests that an extension of debt maturity, measured as a
reduction in the share of debt due in 2-3 years, was also associated with a higher
cumulative total return for US REITs during the financial crisis 2007-2009. This
finding is also consistent with hypothesis 1.
9 We have replicated this analysis using the median of the cumulative total return and capital structure
variables instead. The results, shown in Appendix C.1, are qualitatively similar, except that the level of
debt due in 2-3 years in the US firms loses significance. In return, the change in leverage gains significance.
This finding is consistent with hypothesis 1, that precautionary reductions in leverage were associated with
a higher cumulative total return 2007-2009.
10 For completeness, we have also replicated this analysis using the changes in leverage and debt maturity
over the year 2006 as the sorting variable for the US and European REITs in the sample. Results are
presented in Appendix C.2 and C.3, respectively.
11 The descriptive statistics for the regression sample used in Table 5 are provided in Appendix D.1.
12 It is also robust to including lagged market leverage (not reported).
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 examine hypothesis 1 in the sample of European REITs.
Recall that we do not expect a reduction in leverage or extension of debt maturity to
be associated with a higher cumulative total return for European REITs. Consistent
with this expectation, we find that neither reductions in leverage nor adjustments
to the share of debt due in 2-3 years 13 were associated with a significantly higher
cumulative total return for European REITs during the financial crisis 2007-2009.
While we interpret the coefficient estimates with caution due to the smaller sample
size, these findings are generally consistent with expectations.
However, there may be unobserved factors that drives both changes in leverage and
the subsequent cumulative total return 2007-2009, or the relationship may reflect
pure luck. Therefore, we now examine systematic cross-sectional differences between
the firms that were more likely to adjust their capital structure prior to the financial
crisis and those that were less likely to do so, as per hypothesis 2(a). Table 6 shows
the results. 14
[Insert Table 6 here.]
We find that firms that were more exposed to capital structure risks in terms of
high leverage and short debt maturity prior to the financial crisis were more likely to
reduce those capital structure risks. Column 1 reports that firms with high leverage
were more likely to reduce leverage prior to the financial crisis. Column 2 presents
the result that firms with higher shares of debt due in 2-3 years were more likely to
reduce this exposure. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level, and robust to
the inclusion of our control variables. While this result is based on the 5% cut-off
level used to identify firms that reduced leverage or the share of debt maturing in 2-3
years, the significance of the market leverage and debt maturity variables is robust
to a range of cut-off values for the dependent variables, including their mean and
median (nor reported). Furthermore, consistent with expectations, neither result
holds for the European sample.
We further investigate whether firms with stronger corporate governance were more
likely to prepare for the financial crisis. This analysis refers to hypothesis 2(b). Table
7 presents the results.
13 We note that this result is not robust to including the level of debt due in 2-3 years at the start of the
financial crisis. If both the change and the level are included in the regression, neither is significant. This is
due to the correlation between the change in the share of debt due in 2-3 years and its level at the start of
the financial crisis.
14 The descriptive statistics for the regression sample used in Tables 6 and 7 are provided in Appendix E.1.
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[Insert Table 7 here.]
Column 1 of Table 7 reports that an interaction variable that takes the value of 1 if
market leverage and governance are above the median and 0 otherwise is significant
at the 10% level. Consistent with expectations, our finding suggests that highly
levered firms that had stronger governance were more likely to reduce leverage.
This result holds when controlling for market leverage and the main effect of the
governance score. Again, as expected, we do not find this result for European REITs.
To summarise, our findings suggest that US REITs that reduced capital structure
risks prior to the financial crisis achieved a higher cumulative total return 2007-2009.
In the cross-section, those REITs that were more exposed to capital structure risks,
in terms of high leverage and short debt maturity, were more likely to reduce these
risks, particularly if they had strong corporate governance mechanisms in place. As
expected, we find none of these results in the European sample.
7 Robustness tests
Giacomini, Ling, and Naranjo (2015b) provide empirical evidence on the role of
deviations from target leverage in driving REIT performance. In order to control
for this possibility, we estimate optimal target leverage levels as a function of the
sample firm characteristics considered in our study. We then compute deviations
from estimated target leverage. We include these deviations as an alternative ex-
planatory variable in the regressions for the cumulative total return 2007-2009. Our
main findings are robust to this additional control variable. In the US, we find that
the deviation from target leverage itself is negatively related to the cumulative to-
tal return 2007-2009, suggesting that firms carrying excess leverage relative to their
characteristic-informed optimal target experienced a lower cumulative total return
2007-2009. The findings for the European REITs also remain unchanged from our
main analysis. For the European REITs, target leverage also carries a negative sign
but is not significant. Results are presented in Appendix F.1.
We perform a number of further robustness tests. As none of these additional tests
result in significant alterations of our main findings, we do not tabulate the results
but provide the relevant details below.
It is possible that capital structure choices prior to the financial crisis were subor-
dinate to and thus driven by a different dominating objective, such as the ability
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to take advantage of a stronger financial position to exploit distressed investment
opportunities that may present themselves as a result of the financial crisis in the
future. In order to explore this possibility, we estimate the likelihood to acquire
properties as well as the actual investment volume of our sample firms as a function
of lagged changes in capital structure choices. However, we do not find evidence of
a significant relationship, suggesting that changes in capital structure choices prior
to the financial crisis were not endogenous in the sense that they were driven by the
ulterior objective to take advantage of investment opportunities that present them-
selves as a result of distress during the financial crisis. Rather, observed changes
in capital structure seem more consistent with managerial skill in adjusting the
financial structure of the firm to be resilient to asset value or cash flow shocks.
In alternative specifications, we have controlled for measures of REIT debt rating
as well as the estimated return on the underlying property values, with no mate-
rial impact on our results. Additionally, Tobin’s Q may be endogenous. Therefore,
we replicate our regression analysis excluding this variable. Our results remain un-
changed.
Further, it is possible that there is a certain level of natural variation in leverage
whereas only large changes in this variable are related to the signals managers receive
about changes to future volatility. In order to account for this possibility, we employ
inter-quantile range (IQR) regression. An IQR model using 0.25 and 0.75 quantiles,
with bootstrap robust standard errors, confirms our results.
We also re-estimate the model using outlier-robust regression with a tuning constant
of 10 (or larger). Robust regression first eliminates all observations with Cook’s
distance greater than 1, and then performs additional iterations to further reduce
the potential influence of any outliers. Our main result is robust to this specification.
8 Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that US REITs that adjusted their capital structure ahead
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis outperformed their peers during the financial cri-
sis. This result holds after controlling for the capital structure characteristics at
the start of the financial crisis. On balance, our evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that changes in leverage in the end reflect a component of managerial
skill in reading market signals about significant changes in future volatility. There-
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fore, our findings imply that REIT managers are able to add value to their firm
by dynamically adjusting capital structure in response to signals about future mar-
ket conditions. In economic terms, our results suggest that one standard deviation
reduction in leverage resulted in 5% higher cumulative return during the financial
crisis.
Sun, Titman, and Twite (2015) find that risky capital structure characteristics, such
as high leverage and a high share of debt due in the near future, significantly reduced
the cumulative total return of US REITs over the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Our
work extends this study by documenting that preparing ahead of the financial crisis
also significantly influenced the cumulative return over the financial crisis period.
We find that REITs which reduced leverage and increased debt maturity prior to
the financial crisis achieved a higher cumulative total return during the financial
crisis. In the cross-section, we find that US REITs with the highest capital structure
risk (high leverage and short debt maturity) were more likely to take precautions
by reducing leverage and extending debt maturity. This effect is especially strong
for those REITs with strong corporate governance. In a falsification test, we find
that none of our findings hold for European REITs. This finding seems intuitive as
European REITs did not experience the levels of real estate lending observed in the
US before the financial crisis.
Our finding that preparation ahead of the financial crisis mattered for REIT perfor-
mance during the financial crisis suggests that shareholders use observable manage-
rial actions to identify and reward skill. Our finding further implies that it is not only
the financial state of a firm that matters for performance but also the path it took to
reach that state, to the extent that this path reflects managerial skill in anticipating
future market conditions. We conclude that shareholders identify and reward this
forward-looking skill, driving our empirical findings. However, we acknowledge that
there may be other channels that link pre-crisis adjustments to capital structure
with subsequent performance. Identifying and directly testing such alternatives may
be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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9 Figures and Tables
SNL governance score and REIT price/NAV ratios
.
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Fig. 1. The figure shows a scatter plot between the indicator variable of good (i.e. shareholder-friendly)
corporate governance and REIT discount/premia to NAV for the sample firms in 2006. The scatter plot also
shows a fitted line from an OLS regression of the price/NAV ratio of the sample REITs on the SNL governance
indicator, suggesting that firms with stronger corporate governance (SNL governance indicator=1) achieved
a higher market valuation of equity relative to the value of underlying assets.
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Scatter plots of cumulative total return 2007-2009 as a function of capital structure choices -
US REITs
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(a) Market leverage, US
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(b) Share of debt due in 2-3 years, US
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(c) Change in market leverage, US
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(d) Change in debt due in 2-3 years, US
Fig. 2. The figure shows scatter plots for the cumulative total return on US REITs during the period
2007-2009 as a function of capital structure choices. Variables are defined as in Table 1.
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Scatter plots of cumulative total return 2007-2009 as a function of capital structure choices -
European REITs
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(a) Market leverage, Europe
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(b) Share of debt due in 1-5 years, Europe
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(c) Change in market leverage, Europe
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(d) Change in share of debt due in 1-5 years,
Europe
Fig. 3. The figure shows scatter plots for the cumulative total return on the European REITs during the
period 2007-2009 as a function of capital structure choices. Variables are defined as in Table 1.
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Descriptive statistics for listed equity REITs, 2006
US
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Change in leverage 126 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.08
Change debt due in 2-3 years 99 -0.02 0.24 -0.41 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.30
Market leverage 130 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.31 0.39 0.49 0.63
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 104 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.16 0.30 0.56
SNL governance score 136 0.34 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Log of firm size 132 14.20 1.54 10.90 13.65 14.39 15.15 16.40
Tobin’s q 130 1.55 0.46 1.11 1.24 1.48 1.66 2.32
Cash to assets 132 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.12
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 113 -0.59 0.26 -0.93 -0.80 -0.62 -0.43 -0.12
Europe
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Change in leverage 52 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.15
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 43 0.04 0.16 -0.18 -0.07 0.02 0.16 0.34
Market leverage 59 0.35 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.33 0.44 0.78
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 49 0.42 0.31 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.61 1.00
SNL governance score 68 0.59 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Log of firm size 60 13.98 1.37 12.03 13.10 13.92 14.89 16.23
Tobin’s q 59 1.15 0.30 0.75 1.03 1.12 1.20 1.68
Cash to assets 59 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 63 -0.56 0.23 -0.88 -0.72 -0.58 -0.37 -0.19
Table 1
The table shows the summary statistics for the sample firms, all US and European listed equity REITs on
SNL, at the end of 2006. Variables are defined as outlined below. We measure the change in leverage over the
year 2006 as the first difference of market leverage. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book
value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value
of invested capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated
as number of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure the
change in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we
have to measure the change in debt maturity as the first difference of the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as
European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The control variables considered in our study
are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm size (measured as
market capitalisation), Tobin’s q (ratio of firm market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less
book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets).
We obtain information on the firm’s corporate governance provisions from SNL. The provisions covered by
SNL are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajority requirements. The presence of these provisions
restricts shareholder rights. We calculate a governance score by starting from zero and adding a point for
the presence of each provision.
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Firm characteristics sorted by leverage ratio quintiles in 2006
US firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Market leverage 0.146 0.327 0.395 0.468 0.603 0.457*** (20.32)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 0.216 0.155 0.224 0.240 0.169 -0.047 (-0.83)
Change in leverage -0.035 -0.051 -0.018 -0.003 -0.002 0.0332* (2.03)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years -0.036 -0.075 0.011 0.046 -0.012 0.024 (0.29)
SNL governance score 0.654 0.231 0.308 0.192 0.308 -0.346 (-2.00)
Log of firm size 13.496 14.877 14.572 14.331 13.748 0.252 (0.50)
Tobin’s Q 2.043 1.702 1.463 1.312 1.218 -0.825*** (-6.40)
Cash to assets 0.044 0.037 0.019 0.024 0.022 -0.022 (-1.63)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.468 -0.574 -0.577 -0.752 -0.641 -0.173 (-1.97)
European firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Market leverage 0.090 0.273 0.345 0.427 0.633 0.543*** (13.43)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.458 0.410 0.387 0.487 0.314 -0.144 (-0.81)
Change in leverage 0.011 -0.039 -0.049 0.002 -0.006 -0.018 (-0.42)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years -0.049 0.096 -0.065 0.077 0.118 0.167 (1.66)
SNL governance score 0.583 0.500 0.583 0.833 0.273 -0.311 (-1.51)
Log of firm size 13.037 14.277 14.515 14.050 14.111 1.075 (1.71)
Tobin’s Q 1.290 1.189 1.195 1.098 0.953 -0.338 (-2.01)
Cash to assets 0.062 0.028 0.015 0.023 0.035 -0.027 (-1.13)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.494 -0.573 -0.616 -0.566 -0.644 -0.150 (-2.03)
Table 3
The table presents the firm characteristics of the US and European equity REITs in our sample in 2006 by
leverage ratio quintile. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The Table also shows the spread (Difference)
between the mean variable values across the 5th (highest) and 1st (lowest) leverage ratio quintile alongside
the corresponding t-statistic from a two-group mean-comparison test. Significance is indicated as follows: *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Capital structure choices in 2006 sorted by cumulative total return quintiles 2007-2009
US firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.893 -0.757 -0.622 -0.469 -0.173 0.720*** (23.85)
Market leverage 0.467 0.417 0.321 0.348 0.297 -0.169** (-3.47)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 0.251 0.249 0.183 0.159 0.135 -0.117* (-2.14)
Change in leverage -0.019 -0.011 -0.036 -0.030 -0.040 -0.021 (-1.11)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 0.035 0.063 -0.045 -0.048 -0.151 -0.185 (-1.90)
European firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.846 -0.700 -0.577 -0.411 -0.221 0.626*** (16.42)
Market leverage 0.376 0.476 0.353 0.251 0.394 0.018 (0.23)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.454 0.428 0.277 0.417 0.547 0.093 (0.53)
Change in leverage -0.022 -0.074 -0.003 -0.028 0.035 0.057 (1.80)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0.017 0.031 0.051 0.032 0.056 0.038 (0.47)
Table 4
The table presents the capital structure choices of the US and European equity REITs in our sample in
2006 by quintiles of the cumulative total return 2007-2009. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The
Table also shows the spread (Difference) between the mean variable values across the 5th (highest) and 1st
(lowest) leverage ratio quintile alongside the corresponding t-statistic from a two-group mean-comparison
test. Significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Regression results for cumulative total return, 2007-2009
Dependent variable: Cumulative total return 2007-2009 (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES US US Europe Europe
Change in leverage -0.783** 1.296**
(-2.06) (2.11)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years -0.333***
(-2.90)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0.347
(1.39)
Market leverage -0.455** -0.194
(-2.31) (-0.89)
Log of firm size -0.055*** -0.056** 0.006 -0.048*
(-2.95) (-2.06) (0.16) (-1.95)
Tobin’s q -0.062 0.125** 0.153 0.261***
(-0.99) (2.29) (1.58) (2.81)
Cash to assets -0.206 0.141 -0.461 -0.912
(-0.58) (0.57) (-0.61) (-1.01)
Constant 0.686** 0.337 -0.892* -0.372
(2.44) (0.91) (-1.96) (-1.13)
Observations 106 81 47 40
R-squared 0.367 0.431 0.209 0.194
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5
The table shows the results of the OLS model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs
on SNL in the US and in Europe. The dependent variable is the cumulative total return over the period
2007/2009. All independent variables are measured at the end of 2006, with the exception of the variables
measuring the changes in capital structure, which are measured during the year 2006. Variables are defined
as follows. We measure the change in leverage over the year 2006 as the first difference of market leverage.
Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book value of short-term and long-term interest bearing
debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of invested capital is defined as the sum of total
debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as number of shares outstanding multiplied by
the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure the change in debt maturity as the first difference
of the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure the change in debt maturity
as the first difference of the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year
debt schedule. The control variables considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt
due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s q (ratio of firm
market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the
cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents to total assets). We account for property sector effects using
indicator variables. The t-statistics, calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are shown in
parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Regression results for likelihood to reduce leverage or extend debt maturity, 2006
REGION US Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
Market leverage 6.230*** 4.216
(2.82) (1.51)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 10.022***
(3.85)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 1.662
(1.10)
Log of firm size 0.225 -0.415* 0.867** -0.293
(1.37) (-1.81) (2.46) (-0.86)
Tobin’s q 1.491 0.101 2.59 3.195
(1.33) (0.09) (0.99) (1.61)
Cash to assets 5.654 -0.649 5.052 -8.08
(1.12) (-0.11) (0.77) (-0.84)
Constant -9.941*** 4.126 -17.390*** -1.019
(-3.07) (1.41) (-2.72) (-0.22)
Observations 126 90 48 41
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R squared 0.127 0.260 0.278 0.162
Table 6
The table shows the results of the logit model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs on
SNL in the US (columns (1) and (2)) and in Europe (columns (3) and (4)). The dependent variable is the
likelihood to reduce leverage (columns (1) and (3)) or extend debt maturity (columns (2) and (4)) by 0.05
or more during 2006. Independent variables are lagged by one year, i.e. they are measured at the end of
2005. Variables are defined as follows. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book value of
short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of invested
capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as number
of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure debt maturity
as the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure debt maturity as the share of
debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The control variables
considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years, further the log of firm
size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s q (ratio of firm market value, i.e. market capitalisation plus
total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio (cash and cash equivalents
to total assets). We account for property sector effects using indicator variables. The z-statistics are shown
in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Regression results for likelihood to reduce leverage or extend debt maturity as a function of
corporate governance, 2006
REGION US Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Leverage Maturity Leverage Maturity
High leverage * Strong governance 1.217* -0.155
(1.88) (-0.10)
Short maturity * Strong governance 0.460 29.597
(0.52) (0.01)
Market leverage 4.510* 4.18
(1.92) (1.18)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 9.262***
(3.17)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.837
(0.48)
SNL governance score 0.291 0.403 -1.216 29.602
(0.51) (0.50) (-1.06) (0.01)
Log of firm size 0.185 -0.406* 0.919** -0.287
(1.11) (-1.77) (2.49) (-0.83)
Tobin’s q 1.87 -0.065 3.492 2.704
(1.63) (-0.06) (1.15) (1.38)
Cash to assets 5.87 -0.791 6.739 -8.473
(1.18) (-0.14) (0.97) (-0.90)
Constant -9.799*** 4.095 -18.380*** -29.726
(-2.93) (1.39) (-2.60) (-0.01)
Observations 126 90 48 41
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R squared 0.153 0.298 0.308 0.202
Table 7
The table shows the results of the logit model estimated for the sample firms, the listed equity REITs on
SNL in the US (columns (1) and (2)) and in Europe (columns (3) and (4)). In the US sample, we focus on
the interaction between high (above-median) leverage (column (1)) or below-median shares of debt maturing
in 2-3 years (column (2)). The dependent variable is the likelihood to reduce leverage (columns (1) and (3))
or extend debt maturity (columns (2) and (4)) by 0.05 or more in 2006. Independent variables are lagged by
one year, i.e. they are measured at the end of 2005. For Europe, the analysis is analogous to the US, only
we replace the debt maturity variable with the above-median share of debt maturing in 1-5 years. Variables
are defined as follows. We obtain information on the firm’s corporate governance provisions from SNL. The
provisions covered by SNL are staggered board, poison pill, and supermajority requirements. The presence
of these provisions restricts shareholder rights. We calculate a governance score by starting from zero and
adding a point for the presence of each provision. Market leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (book
value of short-term and long-term interest bearing debt) to market value of invested capital. Market value of
invested capital is defined as the sum of total debt, preferred stock and market capitalisation, calculated as
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the end-of-period share price. For US REITs, we measure debt
maturity as the share of debt due in 2-3 years. For European REITs, we have to measure debt maturity
as the share of debt due in 1-5 years, as European REITs do not report a year-by-year debt schedule. The
control variables considered in our study are the level of leverage and the share of debt due in 2-3 years,
further the log of firm size (measured as market capitalisation), Tobin’s q (ratio of firm market value, i.e.
market capitalisation plus total assets less book value of equity, to total assets), and the cash-to-assets ratio
(cash and cash equivalents to total assets). We account for property sector effects using indicator variables.
The z-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.10.
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Appendices
A Descriptive statistics by property type for the US firms
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Diversified
Change in leverage 16 0.010 0.090 -0.150 -0.040 0.000 0.050 0.270
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 11 -0.090 0.170 -0.410 -0.140 -0.080 0.030 0.190
Market leverage 17 0.430 0.200 0.000 0.350 0.440 0.570 0.740
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 11 0.090 0.060 0.000 0.050 0.080 0.150 0.190
SNL governance score 17 0.410 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000
Log of firm size 17 13.620 1.940 10.340 12.660 14.190 14.870 16.700
Tobin’s Q 17 1.460 0.520 0.940 1.120 1.160 1.700 2.840
Cash to assets 17 0.080 0.100 0.010 0.010 0.050 0.110 0.430
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 16 -0.640 0.240 -0.960 -0.810 -0.650 -0.530 0.070
Health care
Change in leverage 11 0.000 0.070 -0.090 -0.040 -0.020 -0.010 0.160
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 6 0.120 0.120 -0.020 0.000 0.100 0.220 0.280
Market leverage 11 0.250 0.150 0.040 0.060 0.310 0.360 0.450
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 7 0.190 0.160 0.000 0.060 0.210 0.220 0.480
SNL governance score 12 0.500 0.520 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 11 13.920 1.280 11.850 13.250 13.980 15.000 16.120
Tobin’s Q 11 1.720 0.360 1.350 1.430 1.610 1.900 2.520
Cash to assets 11 0.040 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.050 0.270
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 11 -0.310 0.190 -0.680 -0.460 -0.280 -0.170 -0.030
Hotel
Change in leverage 18 -0.020 0.070 -0.170 -0.090 -0.020 0.010 0.130
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 17 0.050 0.160 -0.150 -0.100 0.050 0.190 0.400
Market leverage 18 0.410 0.100 0.220 0.330 0.400 0.470 0.630
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 18 0.220 0.160 0.040 0.090 0.190 0.260 0.580
SNL governance score 18 0.390 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 18 13.930 1.400 10.370 13.200 14.250 14.780 16.280
Tobin’s Q 18 1.320 0.140 1.160 1.190 1.280 1.440 1.650
Cash to assets 18 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.140
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 13 -0.760 0.260 -0.960 -0.860 -0.840 -0.780 0.070
Table A.1
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the US sample firms by property sector. Variables are defined
as in Table 1.
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Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Office
Change in leverage 27 -0.030 0.050 -0.100 -0.070 -0.040 0.000 0.080
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 23 0.030 0.230 -0.250 -0.180 0.010 0.120 0.530
Market leverage 29 0.390 0.160 0.000 0.350 0.410 0.490 0.620
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 25 0.220 0.210 0.000 0.040 0.110 0.380 0.600
SNL governance score 30 0.200 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Log of firm size 30 14.540 1.610 11.240 13.840 14.920 15.350 16.580
Tobin’s Q 29 1.570 0.670 1.110 1.220 1.430 1.590 2.170
Cash to assets 30 0.020 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.030 0.070
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 23 -0.650 0.200 -0.940 -0.760 -0.690 -0.470 -0.360
Residential
Change in leverage 17 -0.040 0.040 -0.110 -0.060 -0.040 -0.020 0.070
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 8 -0.070 0.070 -0.190 -0.110 -0.050 -0.010 0.000
Market leverage 17 0.450 0.140 0.220 0.330 0.430 0.570 0.660
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 8 0.190 0.080 0.060 0.140 0.180 0.240 0.310
SNL governance score 17 0.350 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 17 14.430 1.480 11.660 13.380 14.570 15.360 16.530
Tobin’s Q 17 1.550 0.300 1.030 1.380 1.540 1.660 2.240
Cash to assets 17 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.050
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 14 -0.580 0.140 -0.820 -0.700 -0.590 -0.510 -0.270
Retail
Change in leverage 27 -0.030 0.040 -0.090 -0.070 -0.030 -0.010 0.020
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 26 -0.120 0.310 -0.920 -0.180 -0.050 0.080 0.240
Market leverage 27 0.370 0.140 0.160 0.270 0.370 0.450 0.590
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 26 0.170 0.130 0.000 0.060 0.160 0.300 0.350
SNL governance score 28 0.360 0.620 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000
Log of firm size 28 14.460 1.280 12.320 13.730 14.500 15.200 16.910
Tobin’s Q 27 1.670 0.400 1.160 1.380 1.630 1.970 2.460
Cash to assets 28 0.020 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.050
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 24 -0.620 0.250 -0.930 -0.860 -0.620 -0.460 -0.220
Specialty
Change in leverage 10 0.010 0.100 -0.130 -0.070 0.000 0.070 0.200
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 8 0.050 0.260 -0.480 0.010 0.080 0.150 0.430
Market leverage 11 0.350 0.200 0.000 0.260 0.360 0.450 0.740
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 9 0.330 0.240 0.040 0.140 0.270 0.550 0.730
SNL governance score 14 0.290 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.000
Log of firm size 11 13.850 1.720 9.130 13.690 14.270 14.350 16.230
Tobin’s Q 11 1.500 0.310 1.100 1.320 1.500 1.630 2.000
Cash to assets 11 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.050 0.090
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 12 -0.410 0.310 -0.880 -0.660 -0.370 -0.210 0.070
Table A.2
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the US sample firms by property sector. Variables are defined
as in Table 1.
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B Descriptive statistics by property type for the European firms
Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Diversified
Change in leverage 24 -0.020 0.070 -0.100 -0.070 -0.020 0.000 0.090
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 18 0.030 0.150 -0.180 -0.010 0.010 0.050 0.530
Market leverage 27 0.340 0.230 0.000 0.130 0.330 0.470 0.780
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 20 0.390 0.270 0.000 0.230 0.300 0.550 0.910
SNL governance score 32 0.590 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 27 13.910 1.570 11.020 12.660 13.880 14.790 16.420
Tobin’s Q 27 1.130 0.370 0.750 0.960 1.080 1.180 1.940
Cash to assets 27 0.050 0.060 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.070 0.170
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 30 -0.540 0.220 -0.840 -0.710 -0.580 -0.370 -0.180
Health care
Change in leverage 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 2 -0.130 0.180 -0.260 -0.260 -0.130 0.000 0.000
Market leverage 2 0.320 0.330 0.090 0.090 0.320 0.550 0.550
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 2 0.350 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.350 0.700 0.700
SNL governance score 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log of firm size 2 12.480 0.320 12.260 12.260 12.480 12.700 12.700
Tobin’s Q 2 1.370 0.400 1.100 1.100 1.370 1.650 1.650
Cash to assets 2 0.040 0.030 0.020 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.060
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 2 -0.690 0.250 -0.870 -0.870 -0.690 -0.510 -0.510
Office
Change in leverage 14 -0.010 0.070 -0.140 -0.050 -0.030 0.010 0.180
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 13 0.090 0.160 -0.100 0.000 0.040 0.210 0.410
Market leverage 17 0.380 0.160 0.090 0.290 0.400 0.430 0.830
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 16 0.440 0.350 0.000 0.230 0.380 0.650 1.070
SNL governance score 19 0.740 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 17 13.980 0.930 12.000 13.320 13.920 14.600 15.670
Tobin’s Q 17 1.130 0.220 0.550 1.050 1.130 1.190 1.680
Cash to assets 17 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.090
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 19 -0.560 0.250 -0.970 -0.690 -0.570 -0.320 -0.190
Table B.1
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the European sample firms by property sector. Variables are
defined as in Table 1.
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Variable N Mean SD P5 P25 Median P75 P95
Residential
Change in leverage 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Market leverage 1 0.520 n/a 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520 0.520
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 1 0.040 n/a 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040
SNL governance score 2 0.500 0.710 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 1 14.990 n/a 14.990 14.990 14.990 14.990 14.990
Tobin’s Q 1 1.220 n/a 1.220 1.220 1.220 1.220 1.220
Cash to assets 1 0.020 n/a 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 2 -0.440 0.390 -0.720 -0.720 -0.440 -0.170 -0.170
Retail
Change in leverage 11 -0.030 0.070 -0.110 -0.070 -0.040 0.020 0.150
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 8 -0.010 0.160 -0.340 -0.070 0.030 0.090 0.170
Market leverage 11 0.320 0.070 0.150 0.270 0.330 0.370 0.400
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 8 0.420 0.270 0.070 0.250 0.410 0.480 0.960
SNL governance score 11 0.450 0.520 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 11 14.490 1.500 12.050 13.170 14.450 15.770 16.190
Tobin’s Q 11 1.180 0.210 1.000 1.040 1.140 1.240 1.670
Cash to assets 10 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.040 0.080
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 9 -0.590 0.210 -0.850 -0.740 -0.680 -0.420 -0.210
Specialty
Change in leverage 1 -0.070 n/a -0.070 -0.070 -0.070 -0.070 -0.070
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 2 0.190 0.220 0.030 0.030 0.190 0.340 0.340
Market leverage 1 0.320 n/a 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 2 0.890 0.020 0.880 0.880 0.890 0.900 0.900
SNL governance score 2 0.500 0.710 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000
Log of firm size 2 13.210 0.050 13.170 13.170 13.210 13.250 13.250
Tobin’s Q 1 1.260 n/a 1.260 1.260 1.260 1.260 1.260
Cash to assets 2 0.020 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.030
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 1 -0.710 n/a -0.710 -0.710 -0.710 -0.710 -0.710
Table B.2
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the European sample firms by property sector. Variables are
defined as in Table 1.
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C Quintile tables
C.1 Median capital structure choices 2006 sorted by cumulative total return
quintiles 2007-2009
US firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (χ2)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.883 -0.753 -0.618 -0.470 -0.210 0.673 (45.00***)
Market leverage 0.463 0.427 0.341 0.354 0.342 -0.120 (9.058***)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 0.223 0.175 0.147 0.164 0.074 -0.149 (0.533)
Change in leverage -0.003 -0.026 -0.040 -0.029 -0.035 -0.032 (3.064*)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years 0.047 -0.016 -0.021 -0.064 0.002 -0.045 (0.533)
European firms - Quintile 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (χ2)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.836 -0.696 -0.579 -0.408 -0.220 0.617 (25.000***)
Market leverage 0.396 0.470 0.301 0.268 0.419 0.023 (0.029)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.413 0.417 0.252 0.313 0.457 0.043 (0.476)
Change in leverage -0.012 -0.075 -0.028 -0.018 0.002 0.015 ( 1.000)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0.000 0.011 0.006 0.021 0.034 0.034 (1.759)
Table C.1
The table presents the capital structure choices of the US and European equity REITs in our sample in 2006
by quintiles of the cumulative total return 2007-2009. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The Table also
shows the spread (Difference) between the median variable values across the 5th (highest) and 1st (lowest)
leverage ratio quintile alongside the corresponding χ2-statistic from a two-group median-comparison test.
Significance is indicated as follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.2 Firm characteristics sorted by changes in leverage and debt maturity in
2006 for US firms
Sorted by change in leverage 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Change in leverage -0.102 -0.054 -0.025 0.001 0.076 0.178*** (14.04)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years -0.019 -0.053 0.043 -0.066 0.028 0.046 (0.69)
Market leverage 0.386 0.389 0.342 0.357 0.482 0.0967** (2.71)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 0.198 0.172 0.203 0.219 0.224 0.026 (0.42)
SNL governance score 0.346 0.120 0.520 0.440 0.160 -0.186 (-1.53)
Log of firm size 14.447 14.852 14.143 13.589 14.064 -0.383 (-1.15)
Tobin’s Q 1.548 1.614 1.608 1.656 1.268 -0.281** (-3.34)
Cash to assets 0.042 0.025 0.028 0.036 0.016 -0.026 (-1.55)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.631 -0.581 -0.472 -0.555 -0.740 -0.110 (-1.52)
Sorted by change in maturity 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Change in debt due in 2-3 years -0.335 -0.092 -0.010 0.080 0.269 0.604*** (9.39)
Change in leverage -0.052 -0.006 -0.017 -0.030 -0.028 0.024 (1.41)
Market leverage 0.394 0.378 0.398 0.430 0.384 -0.010 (-0.20)
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 0.087 0.121 0.146 0.278 0.385 0.298*** (7.34)
SNL governance score 0.300 0.350 0.350 0.350 0.368 0.068 (0.40)
Log of firm size 13.671 14.229 14.320 14.631 13.951 0.280 (0.60)
Tobin’s Q 1.501 1.526 1.590 1.462 1.491 -0.010 (-0.07)
Cash to assets 0.030 0.040 0.051 0.021 0.018 -0.012 (-1.18)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.532 -0.686 -0.531 -0.706 -0.663 -0.130 (-1.39)
Table C.2
The table presents the firm characteristics and capital structure variables of the US equity REITs in our
sample in 2006 by quintiles of the changes in leverage (top panel) and debt maturity (bottom panel),
respectively. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The Table also shows the spread (Difference) between
the mean variable values across the 5th (highest) and 1st (lowest) leverage ratio quintile alongside the
corresponding t-statistic from a two-group mean-comparison test. Significance is indicated as follows: *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.3 Firm characteristics sorted by changes in leverage and debt maturity in
2006 for European firms
Sorted by change in leverage 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Change in leverage -0.093 -0.057 -0.025 -0.002 0.088 0.181*** (7.83)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years 0.003 0.037 0.062 0.025 0.056 0.053 (0.56)
Market leverage 0.387 0.397 0.328 0.224 0.403 0.016 (0.22)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.461 0.491 0.493 0.371 0.287 -0.174 (-1.24)
SNL governance score 0.364 0.500 0.636 0.500 0.900 0.536** (2.88)
Log of firm size 15.334 14.426 13.966 13.446 12.981 -2.353*** (-4.50)
Tobin’s Q 1.188 1.212 1.137 1.196 1.038 -0.150 (-1.42)
Cash to assets 0.021 0.036 0.027 0.034 0.037 0.016 (0.84)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.696 -0.627 -0.545 -0.541 -0.540 0.157 (1.75)
Sorted by change in maturity 1 2 3 4 5 Difference (t-stat)
Change in debt due in 1-5 years -0.153 -0.016 0.023 0.099 0.293 0.446*** (8.48)
Change in leverage -0.016 -0.045 0.003 -0.043 -0.007 0.009 (0.18)
Market leverage 0.339 0.335 0.322 0.354 0.425 0.086 (1.13)
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 0.348 0.281 0.472 0.423 0.735 0.387** (3.38)
SNL governance score 0.667 0.500 0.714 0.444 0.875 0.208 (0.98)
Log of firm size 13.977 14.224 13.090 14.981 13.574 -0.403 (-0.73)
Tobin’s Q 1.313 1.200 1.207 1.064 1.024 -0.289 (-1.36)
Cash to assets 0.034 0.019 0.038 0.020 0.054 0.020 (0.66)
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 -0.624 -0.610 -0.566 -0.627 -0.599 0.025 (0.20)
Table C.3
The table presents the firm characteristics and capital structure variables of the European equity REITs in
our sample in 2006 by quintiles of the changes in leverage (top panel) and debt maturity (bottom panel),
respectively. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The Table also shows the spread (Difference) between
the mean variable values across the 5th (highest) and 1st (lowest) leverage ratio quintile alongside the
corresponding t-statistic from a two-group mean-comparison test. Significance is indicated as follows: *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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D Descriptive statistics for regression sample in Table 5
Variable N Mean SD
Column 1
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 106 -0.600 0.260
Market leverage 106 0.380 0.160
Change in leverage 106 -0.030 0.060
Log of firm size 106 14.230 1.500
Tobin’s Q 106 1.580 0.470
Cash to assets 106 0.030 0.060
Column 2
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 81 -0.620 0.250
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 81 -0.020 0.230
Log of firm size 81 14.210 1.360
Tobin’s Q 81 1.550 0.390
Cash to assets 81 0.040 0.060
Column 3
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 47 -0.590 0.210
Market leverage 47 0.370 0.170
Change in leverage 47 -0.020 0.070
Log of firm size 47 14.120 1.370
Tobin’s Q 47 1.170 0.330
Cash to assets 47 0.030 0.040
Column 4
Cumulative total return 2007-2009 40 -0.600 0.200
Chenge in debt due in 1-5 years 40 0.030 0.160
Log of firm size 40 14.010 1.420
Tobin’s Q 40 1.170 0.350
Cash to assets 40 0.030 0.050
Table D.1
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the conditional regression sample in the results shown in
Table 5.
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E Descriptive statistics for regression sample in Tables 6 and 7
Variable N Mean SD
Column 1
Reduction in leverage 126 0.330 0.470
High leverage * Strong governance 126 0.370 0.480
Market leverage 126 0.410 0.160
SNL governance score 126 0.320 0.500
Log of firm size 126 14.060 1.500
Tobin’s Q 126 1.400 0.290
Cash to assets 126 0.030 0.050
Column 2
Extension of maturity 90 0.390 0.490
Short maturity * Strong governance 90 0.440 0.500
Share of debt due in 2-3 years 90 0.220 0.170
SNL governance score 90 0.340 0.500
Log of firm size 90 14.020 1.380
Tobin’s Q 90 1.370 0.280
Cash to assets 90 0.030 0.050
Column 3
Reduction in leverage 48 0.350 0.480
High leverage * Strong governance 48 0.200 0.400
Market leverage 48 0.370 0.190
SNL governance score 48 0.590 0.500
Log of firm size 48 13.810 1.440
Tobin’s Q 48 1.110 0.250
Cash to assets 48 0.040 0.060
Column 4
Extension of maturity 41 0.260 0.450
Short maturity * Strong governance 42 0.310 0.470
Share of debt due in 1-5 years 41 0.400 0.270
SNL governance score 41 0.620 0.490
Log of firm size 41 13.900 1.480
Tobin’s Q 41 1.090 0.260
Cash to assets 41 0.040 0.060
Table E.1
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the conditional regression sample in the results shown in
Tables 6 and 7.
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(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Cumulative total return 2007-2009 US Europe
Change in leverage -0.800** 1.297**
(-2.10) (2.11)
Deviation from target leverage -0.442** -0.170
(-2.18) (-0.76)
Log of firm size -0.062*** 0.002
(-3.54) (0.06)
Tobin’s Q 0.034 0.200***
(0.68) (2.86)
Cash to assets -0.162 -0.465
(-0.44) (-0.61)
Constant 0.515* -0.968*
(1.78) (-2.01)
Observations 106 47
R-squared 0.364 0.206
Sector effects Yes Yes
Table F.1
The table presents the regression results corresponding to the main results in Table 5 with deviations from
target leverage as an alternative control variable to the overall level of leverage. Target leverage is estimated
in a first stage as a function of the firm characteristics in considered our study.
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